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Abstract
Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party cryptographic protocol by which the
sender can securely and reliably transmit messages to the receiver using multiple channels. An
adversary for SMT can corrupt a subset of the channels and make eavesdropping and tampering
over the channels. In this work, we introduce a game-theoretic security model for SMT in
which adversaries have some preferences for the protocol execution. We define rational “timid”
adversaries who prefer to violate the security requirements, but do not prefer the tampering to
be detected. Such adversaries could arise since they may fear losing their corrupted channels for
which they needed some cost or risks.
First, we consider the basic setting in which a single adversary attacks the protocol. We
show that, even if all but one of the channels are corrupted, we can construct perfect SMT
protocols against rational adversaries. In the traditional cryptographic setting, perfect SMT
can be constructed only when the adversary corrupts a minority of the channels. Our results
demonstrate a way of circumventing the cryptographic impossibility results by a game-theoretic
approach.
Next, we study the setting in which all the channels can be corrupted by multiple adversaries
who do not cooperate. Since we cannot hope for any security if a single adversary corrupts all
the channels or multiple adversaries cooperate maliciously, the scenario can arise from a game-
theoretic model. We present several perfect SMT protocols, including a non-interactive protocol
based on the idea of cheater-identifiable secret sharing. We also study the scenario in which both
malicious and rational adversaries exist.
1 Introduction
It is common to use the information network to send and receive messages. The physical channels
between senders and receivers are composed of the communication apparatuses, allowing an adver-
sary to eavesdrop or tamper. While we usually use public-key cryptosystems to protect data over
communication, their security needs computational assumptions. It is desirable to develop methods
of achieving security in the information-theoretic sense.
In the two-party cryptographic setting, we typically assume a single communication channel
between the parties. However, current network technologies can let many channels be available.
Secure Message Transmission (SMT), introduced by Dolev et al. [10], is a cryptographic protocol
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for securely transmitting messages through multiple channels. Even if an adversary corrupts t out
of n channels and makes eavesdropping and tampering over the corrupted channels, the messages
are securely and correctly transmitted to the receiver by SMT. The requirements for SMT consist
of privacy and reliability. The privacy guarantees that the adversary can obtain no information
about the transmitted message, and the reliability does that the receiver recovers the message sent
by the sender. If an SMT protocol satisfies both the requirements perfectly, the protocol is called
a perfect SMT. Spini and Ze´mor [37] gave the most round-efficient perfect SMT. Dolev et al. [10]
showed that any one-round perfect SMT must satisfy t < n/3 and that any perfect SMT whose
round complexity is at least two must satisfy t < n/2. Garay and Ostrovsky [18] introduced the
model of SMT by Public Discussion (SMT-PD), which allows transmission over an authentic and
reliable public channel in addition to the n channels. Shi et al. [36] further studied SMT-PD and
constructed a round-optimal perfect SMT-PD. In the context of network coding, similar but more
general problems have been studied, and some schemes [39] can be seen as SMT protocols.
In the standard setting of cryptography, we assume the participants are either honest or mali-
cious. The former will follow the protocol description honestly, and the later may deviate from the
protocol maliciously. In general, malicious behavior may be illegal and involve some risks, which
implies that adversaries in the standard cryptographic setting behave maliciously regardless of their
risk. However, adversaries in real life may decide his behavior by taking the risk into account.
To capture such situations, we incorporate game-theoretic“rational” participants into cryptogra-
phy. Halpern and Teague [25] first studied the rational behavior of participants for secret sharing.
Since then, rational secret sharing has been intensively studied [1, 19, 31, 32, 4, 12, 30]. Moreover,
there have been many studies using game-theoretic analysis of cryptographic primitives/protocols,
including two-party computation [3, 21], leader election [20, 2], Byzantine agreement [22], consen-
sus [26], public-key encryption [40, 42], delegation of computation [5, 23, 7, 24, 8, 28], and protocol
design [16, 17]. Among them, several works [22, 5, 23, 24, 16] used the rationality of adversaries to
circumvent the impossibility results.
Groce et al. [22] studied the Byzantine agreement problem in the presence of a rational adversary.
They showed that given some knowledge of the adversary’s preference, a perfectly secure Byzantine
agreement is possible for t corruptions among n players for any t < n, for which the security against
t ≥ n/2 corruptions is impossible in the standard adversary model.
This work shows that the impossibility results of SMT can also be circumvented by considering
adversaries’ rationality. As in the Byzantine agreement, we introduce a rational adversary for SMT
who has some preference for the protocol execution outcome. More specifically, we define timid
adversaries who prefer to violate the requirements of SMT, but do not prefer the tampering to be
detected. Such preferences can be justified if adversaries fear to lose their corrupted channels when
some tampering was detected.
Our Results
First, as the most basic setting, we define the security of perfect SMT in the presence of a single
rational adversary. It is a natural extension of the standard cryptographic setting to the rational
one. We show that the almost-reliable SMT-PD protocol of [36] works as a “perfect” SMT protocol.
An intuitive reason is that timid adversaries do not have an incentive to attack the channels by
fearing to be detected. Thus perfect reliability follows as well as perfect secrecy. To construct non-
interactive SMT protocols, we consider “strictly” timid adversaries, who prefer being undetected
to violate the security requirements. We show that for such adversaries, robust secret sharing
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Table 1: Summary of the Results of Single-Adversary Setting
Adversary PD∗ Resiliency Security #Round Construction
Malicious — t < n/3 Perfect 1 Exist ([10])
Malicious — t ≥ n/3 Perfect 1 Impossible ([10])
Malicious — t < n/2 Perfect 2 Exist ([33, 37])
Malicious — t < n/2 Almost Reliable 1 Exist ([39]1)
Timid — t < n/2 Perfect 1 Exist (Corollary 3)
Malicious — t ≥ n/2 Perfect 2 Impossible ([10])
Malicious X t ≥ n/2 Almost Reliable 2 Impossible ([36])
Timid — t ≥ n/2 Perfect — Impossible (Corollary 2)
Malicious X t < n Almost Reliable 3 Exist ([11, 18, 36, 15])
Timid X t < n Perfect 3 Exist (Theorem 3)
Strictly Timid — t < n Perfect 1 Exist (Theorem 4)
∗PD represents the public discussion model.
schemes, in which any forgery of shares can be detected with high probability, can be used as a
non-interactive SMT protocol. The reason is that since any tampering will be detected with high
probability, keeping silent is the best strategy for the adversary. Both protocols are perfectly secure
against timid adversaries corrupting t out of n channels for any t < n, which is impossible in the
standard setting of SMT protocols. We also present an impossibility result of constructing SMT
protocols against general timid adversaries corrupting t ≥ n/2 channels. The result demonstrates
that the public discussion model is necessary for the first protocol, and the strict timidness is
necessary for the second protocol. The results are summarized in Table 1.
Next, we study the setting in which all the channels may be corrupted by multiple timid adver-
saries. More specifically, we assume that at least two adversaries exclusively corrupt subsets of the
channels and prefer to violate the security requirements without being detected. We also assume
that each adversary prefers other adversaries’ tampering to be detected. This additional assumption
makes rational adversaries avoid cooperating. If a single adversary corrupts all the channels, we
cannot hope for any security of SMT. Thus, multiple conflicting adversaries are necessary for achiev-
ing security. We show that secure SMT protocols exist even if such rational adversaries corrupt all
the channels. The SMT-PD protocol of [36] also works in this setting as perfect SMT-PD. To con-
struct perfect SMT protocols without public discussion, we employ the idea of cheater-identifiable
secret sharing (CISS), in which every player who submits a forged share in the reconstruction phase
can be identified. We construct a non-interactive SMT protocol based on the CISS of Hayashi and
Koshiba [27]. Technically, our construction employs pairwise independent (a.k.a. strongly universal)
hash functions instead of universal hash functions in [27]. Since the security requirements of CISS
are not sufficient for proving the security of SMT against timid adversaries, we provide the security
analysis of our protocol, not for general CISS-based SMT protocols. The limitation of CISS is that
the number of forged shares should be a minority. Namely, the above construction only works for
adversaries who corrupt less than n/2 channels. We show that for “strictly” timid adversaries, a
1The paper studied more general problems of secure network coding. By considering a simple n-link network as in
SMT and assuming the adversary who eavesdrops and tampers with the same links, the coding scheme of [39] gives
a construction of an almost-reliable SMT protocol for t < n/2.
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Table 2: Perfect SMT Protocols
Adversary PD
Total
#Adv.
Resiliency
#Round References
Resiliency per Adv.
Malicious — < n/3 1 < n/3 1 [10]
Malicious — < n/2 1 < n/2 2 [33, 37]
Timid — < n/2 1 < n/2 1 Corollary 3
Timid X < n 1 < n 3 Theorem 3
Strictly Timid — < n 1 < n 1 Theorem 4
Timid/Malicious — n ≥ 2 < n/6 1 Theorem 9
Timid — n ≥ 2 < n/2 1 Theorem 7
Timid X n ≥ 2 < n 3 Theorem 6
Strictly Timid — n ≥ 2 < n 1 Theorem 8
variant of our CISS-based protocol works as a perfect SMT protocol even if each adversary corrupts
a majority of the channels.
Finally, we consider the setting in which a malicious adversary exists as well as rational ad-
versaries. Namely, there are heterogeneous adversaries, all but one behave rationally, but one acts
maliciously. We believe this setting is preferable because the assumption that all of the adversaries
are rational may not be realistic. We show that a modification of the CISS-based protocol achieves
a non-interactive perfect SMT protocol against such adversaries. The protocol is secure as long as
a malicious adversary corrupts t∗ ≤ ⌊(n − 1)/3⌋ channels, and each rational adversary corrupts at
most min{⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ − t∗, ⌊(n − 1)/3⌋} channels.
We summarize constructions of perfect SMT protocols both for the single-adversary and the
multiple-adversary settings in Table 2. The total resiliency is the maximum number of corrupted
channels for which the protocol can achieve security.
We note that the single-adversary setting can be seen as a special case of the multiple-adversary
setting. Some protocols for multiple adversaries may work against single adversaries. We show that
the protocol of Theorem 7 implies a non-interactive protocol for single adversaries that is secure
against t < n/2 corruption (Corollary 3). This result circumvents the impossibility of constructing
one-round protocols for t ≥ n/3 in [10] by a game-theoretic consideration.
Organization
We describe the definitions and the known results of secure message transmission in Section 2. The
security of SMT against a single adversary is given in Section 3, and our protocols are presented
in Section 4. In Section 5, we show an impossibility result for general timid adversaries. We
define the security of SMT against multiple adversaries in Section 6 and give the constructions
of SMT protocols in Section 7. We study a mixed model of rational and malicious adversaries in
Section 8. We conclude the paper in Section 9. In the appendix, we present several cryptographic
building blocks for our protocols, including the protocol of [36], secret sharing schemes, and pairwise
independent hash functions.
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2 Secure Message Transmission
We assume that a sender S and a receiver R are connected by n channels. SMT protocols proceed
in rounds. In each round, either S or R can send messages over the channels. The messages are
delivered before the next round starts. The adversary A can corrupt at most t channels out of the
n channels. Such an adversary is referred to as t-adversary. On the corrupted channels, A can
eavesdrop, block communication, or place any messages on them. We assume that A is rushing.
Namely, in each round, A can decide the actions on the corrupted channels after observing what is
sent on the corrupted channels. We consider computationally unbounded A.
Let M be the message space. In SMT, the sender tries to send a message in M to the receiver,
and the receiver outputs the received message after the protocol execution. For an SMT protocol Π,
let MS denote the random variable of the message sent by S and MR the message output by R. An
execution of Π can be completely characterized by the random coins of all the parties, namely, S,
R, and A, and the message MS . Let VA(m, rA) denote the view of A when the protocol is executed
with MS = m and the random coins rA of A. Specifically, VA(m, rA) consists of the messages sent
over the corrupted channels when the protocol is run with MS = m and A’s random coins rA.
We formally define the security requirements of SMT protocols.
Definition 1. A protocol between S and R is (ε, δ)-Secure Message Transmission (SMT) against
t-adversary if the following three conditions are satisfied against any t-adversary A:
• Correctness: For any m ∈ M, if MS = m and A does not change messages sent over the
corrupted channels, then Pr[MR = m] = 1.
• Privacy: For any m0,m1 ∈ M and rA ∈ {0, 1}
∗, it holds that
∆(VA(m0, rA), VA(m1, rA)) ≤ ε,
where ∆(X,Y ) denotes the statistical distance between two random variables X and Y over a
finite set Ω, which is defined by
∆(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
u∈Ω
|Pr[X = u]− Pr[Y = u]| .
• Reliability: For any message m ∈ M, when MS = m,
Pr[MR 6= m] ≤ δ,
where the probability is taken over the random coins of S, R, and A.
A protocol achieving (0, 0)-SMT is called perfect SMT. If a protocol achieves (0, δ)-SMT for
small δ, it is called almost-reliable SMT.
Dolev et al. [10] characterized the trade-off between the achievability and the round complexity
of perfect SMT.
Theorem 1 ([10]). One-round perfect SMT protocols against t-adversary exist if and only if t < n/2.
Also, multi-round perfect SMT protocols against t-adversary exist if and only if t < n/3.
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SMT by Public Discussion
In addition to the n channels, we may assume that S and R can use an authentic and reliable public
channel on which messages are publicly accessible and guaranteed to be correctly delivered. Such
protocols are referred to as SMT by Public Discussion (SMT-PD).
Franklin and Wright [11] gave an impossibility result of SMT-PD by using different terminology.
(See [14] for this fact.)
Theorem 2 ([11]). Perfectly-reliable (δ = 0) SMT-PD protocols against t-adversary exist only if
t < n/2.
Shi et al. [36] gave several impossibility results of SMT-PD and constructed a round-optimal
SMT-PD protocol. Since we use their protocol in this work, we describe it in Appendix A.1.
3 SMT against a Single Rational Adversary
We define our security model of SMT protocol against a single rational adversary. The rationality
of the adversary is characterized by a utility function that represents the preference of the adversary
over possible outcomes of the protocol execution.
We can consider various preferences of the adversary regarding the SMT protocol execution.
The adversary may prefer to violate the privacy or the reliability of SMT protocols. Also, the
adversary may prefer to violate the above properties without being the tampering detected. Here,
we consider the adversary who prefers (1) to violate the privacy, (2) to violate the reliability, and
(3) the tampering to be undetected.
To define the utility function, we specify the SMT game as follows.
The SMT game. For an SMT protocol Π, we define our SMT game Gamesngl(Π,A) against a
single adversary A. First, set three parameters guess = suc = detect = 0. For the message space
M, choose m ∈ M uniformly at random, and run the protocol Π in which the message to be sent
is MS = m. In the protocol execution, as in the usual SMT, the adversary A can corrupt at most
t channels and tamper with any messages sent over the corrupted channels. If the sender or the
receiver sends a special message “DETECT” during the execution, set detect = 1. After running
the protocol, the receiver outputs MR, and the adversary outputs MA. If MR = MS , set suc = 1.
If MA =MS , set guess = 1. The outcome of the game is (guess, suc, detect).
The utility of the adversary is defined as the expected utility in the SMT game.
Definition 2 (Utility). The utility u(A, U) of the adversary A with utility function U is the expected
value E[U(out)], where U is a function that maps the outcome out = (guess, suc, detect) of the game
Gamesngl(Π,A) to real values and the probability is taken over the randomness of the game.
The utility function U characterizes the type of adversaries. If the adversary has the preferences
(1)-(3) as above, the utility function may have the property such that for any two outcomes out =
(guess, suc, detect) and out′ = (guess′, suc′, detect′) of the SMT game,
1. U(out) > U(out′) if guess > guess′, suc = suc′, and detect = detect′;
2. U(out) > U(out′) if guess = guess′, suc < suc′, and detect = detect′;
3. U(out) > U(out′) if guess = guess′, suc = suc′, and detect < detect′.
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Based on the utility function of the adversary, we define the security of SMT against rational
adversaries. In particular, regarding the security requirements, we only consider perfect SMT.
Definition 3 (PSMT against a Rational Adversary). An SMT protocol Π is perfectly secure against
a rational t-adversary with utility function U if there is a t-adversary B such that
1. Perfect security: Π is (0, 0)-SMT against B; and
2. Nash equilibrium: u(A, U) ≤ u(B, U) for any t-adversary A.
The perfect security guarantees that an adversary B is harmless. The Nash equilibrium guar-
antees that no adversary A can gain more utility than B. Thus, the above security implies that no
adversary A can gain more utility than the harmless adversary. Namely, the adversary does not
have an incentive to deviate from the strategy of the harmless adversary B.
In the security proof of our protocol, we will consider an adversary B who does not tamper with
any messages on the channels and outputs a random message from M as MA. We call such B a
random guessing adversary. If B is random guessing, then the perfect security immediately follows
from the correctness property of Π.
Timid Adversaries
We construct secure protocols against timid adversaries, who prefer to violate the security require-
ments of SMT protocols and do not prefer the tampering to be detected. More formally, the utility
function of such adversaries should have properties such that
1. U(out) > U(out′) if guess = guess′, suc < suc′, and detect = detect′; and
2. U(out) > U(out′) if guess = guess′, suc = suc′, and detect < detect′,
where out = (guess, suc, detect, abort) and out′ = (guess′, suc′, detect′, abort′) are the outcomes of the
SMT game. Let Utimid be the set of utility functions that satisfy the above conditions.
Also, timid adversaries may have the property that being undetected is preferable to violating
security. Such adversaries have the following utility:
3. U(out) > U(out′) if guess = guess′, suc > suc′, and detect < detect′.
Let Ust-timid be the set of utility functions satisfying the above three conditions. An adversary is
timid if his utility function is in Utimid, and strictly timid if the utility function is in Ust-timid.
In the analysis of our protocols, we need the following four values of utility:
• u1 is the utility when Pr[guess = 1] =
1
|M| , suc = 0, and detect = 0;
• u2 is the utility when Pr[guess = 1] =
1
|M| , suc = 1, and detect = 0;
• u3 is the utility when Pr[guess = 1] =
1
|M| , suc = 0, and detect = 1;
• u4 is the utility when Pr[guess = 1] =
1
|M| , suc = 1, and detect = 1.
It follows from the properties of utility functions in Utimid that u1 > max{u2, u3} and min{u2, u3} >
u4. For utility functions in Ust-timid, it holds that u1 > u2 > u3 > u4.
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4 Protocols against a Timid Adversary
4.1 Protocol by Public Discussion
We show that the SJST protocol of [36], described in Section A.1, works as a perfect SMT-PD
protocol against a timid adversary. More specifically, we slightly modify the SJST protocol such
that in the second and the third rounds, if bi = 1 in B or vj = 1 in V for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the
special message “DETECT” is also sent together. We clarify the parameters for which the SJST
protocol works as SMT against timid adversaries.
Theorem 3. If the parameter ℓ in the SJST protocol satisfies
ℓ ≥ max
{
1 + log2 t+ log2
u3 − u4
u2 − u4 − α
, 1 +
1
t
log2
u1 − u3
α
}
for some α ∈ (0, u2 − u4), then the protocol is perfectly secure against a rational t-adversary with
utility function U ∈ Utimid for any t < n.
Proof. The perfect security of Definition 3 immediately follows by letting B be a random guessing
adversary. We show that the strategy of B is a Nash equilibrium. Note that u(B, U) = u2, since
Pr[guess = 1] = Pr[MA = MS ] = 1/|M| in the SMT game. Thus, it is sufficient to show that
u(A, U) ≤ u2 for any t-adversary A. Also, note that, since the SJST protocol achieves the perfect
privacy, it holds that Pr[guess = 1] = 1/|M| for any t-adversary.
Since messages in the second and the third rounds are sent through the public channel, the
adversary A can tamper with messages only in the first round. If A changes the lengths of ri and
Ri, the tampering of the i-th channel will be detected. Such channels are simply ignored in the
second and third rounds. Thus, such tampering cannot increase the utility. Hence, we assume that
A does not change the lengths of ri and Ri in the first round.
Suppose that A corrupts some t channels in the first round. Namely, there are exactly t distinct
i’s such that (r′i, R
′
i) 6= (ri, Ri). Note that the tampering on the i-th channel such that r
′
i 6= ri
and R′i = Ri does not increase the probability that suc = 0, but may increase the probability
of detection. Thus, we also assume that R′i 6= Ri for all the corrupted channels. We define the
following three events:
• E1: No tampering is detected in the protocol;
• E2: At least one but not all tampering actions are detected;
• E3: All the t tampering actions are detected.
Note that all the events are disjoint, and either event should occur. Namely, we have that Pr[E1] +
Pr[E2] + Pr[E3] = 1. It follows from the discussion in Appendix A.2 that the probability that the
tampering action on one channel is not detected is 21−ℓ. Since each hash function hi is chosen
independently for each channel, we have that Pr[E1] = 2
(1−ℓ)t. Similarly, we obtain that Pr[E3] =
(1− 21−ℓ)t. Note that the utility when E1 occurs is at most u1. Also, the utilities when E2 and E3
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occur are at most u3 and u4, respectively. Therefore, the utility of A is
u(A, U) ≤ u1 · Pr[E1] + u3 · Pr[E2] + u4 · Pr[E3]
= u3 + (u1 − u3) Pr[E1]− (u3 − u4) Pr[E3]
≤ u3 + (u1 − u3)2
(1−ℓ)t − (u3 − u4)
(
1− t21−ℓ
)
≤ u3 + α− (u3 − u4)
(
1− t21−ℓ
)
(1)
≤ u2, (2)
where we use the relations ℓ ≥ 1 + 1
t
log2
u1−u3
α
and ℓ ≥ 1 + log2 t + log2
u3−u4
u2−u4−α
in (1) and (2),
respectively. Thus, the utility of A is at most u2, and hence the statement follows.
If u2 > u3, which holds for strictly timid adversaries, by choosing α = u2− u3, the condition on
ℓ is that
ℓ ≥ max
{
1 + log2 t, 1 +
1
t
log2
u1 − u3
u2 − u3
}
.
4.2 Protocol against a Strictly Timid Adversary
We show that, under the condition that u2 > u3, a robust secret sharing scheme gives a non-
interactive perfect SMT protocol. Namely, we can construct a non-interactive protocol for strictly
timid adversaries. The definition and the construction of robust secret sharing are given in Ap-
pendix A.3
Let (Share,Reconst) be a (t, n, δ)-robust secret sharing scheme with range M. In the protocol,
given a message m ∈ M, the sender generates n shares (s1, . . . , sn) by Share(m), and sends each si
over the i-th channel. The receiver simply recovers the message by Reconst({i, s˜i}i∈{1,...,n}), where
s˜i is the received message over the i-th channel.
Theorem 4. The above protocol based on a (t, n, δ)-robust secret sharing scheme is perfectly secure
against rational a t-adversary with utility function U ∈ Ust-timid if U satisfies that u2 > u3 and
δ ≤
u2 − u3
u1 − u3
.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3, we consider a random guessing adversary B. Then, the perfect
security immediately follows.
We show that for any t-adversary A, u(A, U) ≤ u(B, U). As discussed in the proof of Theorem 3,
it is sufficient to prove that u(A, U) ≤ u2 for any A. Since the underlying secret sharing has the
perfect privacy, we have that Pr[guess = 1] = 1/|M| for any t-adversary. Suppose A corrupts some
t channels and alters some messages si into different s˜i. It follows from the robustness of secret
sharing that the tampering is detected with probability at least 1 − δ, in which case the secret is
not recovered. Thus, the utility of A is
u(A, U) ≤ (1− δ)u3 + δu1
≤ u2, (3)
where (3) follows from the assumption. Therefore, the statement follows.
The following corollary immediately follows.
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Corollary 1. Let F be a finite field of size q = 2ℓ, and d be any odd integer. The non-interactive
protocol based on Theorem 11 is an SMT protocol with message space Fd that is perfectly secure
against rational a t-adversary with utility function U ∈ Ust-timid for any t < n ≤ 2
ℓd if
ℓ ≥ log2(d+ 1) + log2
u1 − u3
u2 − u3
.
5 Impossibility Result for General Timid Adversaries
We show that there is no SMT protocol that does not use the public channel and is secure against a
general timid t-adversary for t ≥ n/2. The result implies that using the public channel in Theorem 3
is necessary for achieving t ≥ n/2. It also demonstrates the necessity of restricting the utility in
Theorem 4 for constructing protocols for t ≥ n/2 without using the public channel.
Theorem 5. For any SMT protocol without using the public channel that is perfectly secure against
a rational t-adversary with utility function U ∈ Utimid, if U has the relation
u2 <
1
2
(
1−
1
|M|
)
u3
then t < n/2, where M is the message space of the protocol.
Proof. Let Π be a protocol in the statement. We construct a t-adversary A for t = ⌈n/2⌉ that can
successfully attack Π. For simplicity, we assume that n = 2t.
Let B be a random guessing adversary. Since Π is (0, 0)-SMT against B, it holds that u(B, U) ≤
u2. We show the existence of a t-adversary A that achieves u(A, U) > u2, which implies that Π
cannot achieve a Nash equilibrium.
In the SMT game, a message m ∈ M is randomly chosen, and, on input m, Π generates
(sj1, . . . , s
j
n) for j = 1, . . . , where s
j
i is the message to be sent over the i-th channel in the j-th round.
In the game, A does the following:
• Randomly choose I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that |I| = t, and corrupt the i-th channel for every
i ∈ I.
• Randomly choose m˜ ∈ M, and simulate Π on input m˜. Let s˜ji be the message generated for
the i-th channel in the j-th round.
• In each round j, for every i ∈ I, on receiving sji through the i-th channel, exchange s
j
i for s˜
j
i .
For this attack, it is impossible for the receiver to distinguish which message, m or m˜, was origi-
nally transmitted by the sender since both messages for m and m˜ are equally mixed. Hence, the
probability that suc = 1, denoted by ps, is at most
ps ≤
1
2
(
1−
1
|M|
)
+
1
|M|
=
1
2
(
1 +
1
|M|
)
,
where 1/|M| comes from the even that m˜ = m.
Let pd be the probability that Π outputs “DETECT” messages during the execution against
the above attack. Without loss of generality, we assume that if Π does not output “DETECT”
messages, the receiver outputs some message at the end of the protocol. If the tampering of A is
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not detected, the utility of A is at least u1 with probability 1− ps, and at least u2 with probability
ps. If some tampering is detected, then there can be two cases: (1) the receiver does not output any
message; and (2) the receiver outputs some message. In case (1), the utility of A is u3. In case (2),
the probability that the suc = 1 is at most ps by the same argument as above. Hence, the utility of
A when the tampering was detected is at least (1− ps)u3. Thus, the utility of A in the SMT game
is at least
u(A, U) ≥ (1− pd) ((1− ps)u1 + psu2) + pd(1− ps)u3
= (1− ps)u1 + psu2 − pd ((1− ps)u1 + psu2 − (1− ps)u3)
≥ (1− ps)u3 (4)
≥
1
2
(
1−
1
|M|
)
u3
> u2, (5)
where (4) follows from the fact that pd ≤ 1 and (1−ps)u1+psu2−(1−ps)u3 ≥ 0, and the assumption
on U is used in (5). Therefore, Π does not satisfy the PSMT security for t ≥ n/2.
When n = 2t− 1, the same attack as the above A can be implemented by invalidating the n-th
channel by substituting ⊥ for every message over the n-th channel.
The theorem gives the following corollary.
Corollary 2. There is no SMT protocol without public channel that is perfectly secure against a
rational t-adversary with utility function U for every U ∈ Utimid and t ≥ ⌈n/2⌉.
6 SMT against Multiple Rational Adversaries
We define our security model of SMT in the presence of multiple rational adversaries. For simplicity,
we assume that each adversary corrupts different channels. The main difference from the single-
adversary model in Section 3 is that each adversary may prefer the tampering of other adversaries
to be detected.
We assume that there are λ adversaries 1, 2, . . . , λ for λ ≥ 2 and adversary j ∈ {1, . . . , λ}
exclusively corrupts at most tj channels out of the n channels for tj ≥ 1. It holds that
∑λ
j=1 tj ≤ n.
The SMT Game. For an SMT protocol Π, we define our SMT game Gamemult(Π,A1, . . . ,Aλ)
against λ adversaries with the strategy profile (A1, . . . ,Aλ). First, set parameters suc = 0 and
guessj = detectj = 0 for every j ∈ {1, . . . , λ}. For the message space M of Π, choose m ∈ M
uniformly at random, and run the protocol Π in which the message to be sent is MS = m. In
the protocol execution, the sender or the receiver may send a special message “DETECT at i” for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, meaning that some tampering was detected on channel i. Then, if adversary j ∈
{1, . . . , λ} corrupts channel i, set detectj = 1. After running the protocol, the receiver outputs MR,
and each adversary j outputs Mj for j ∈ {1, . . . , λ}. If MR = MS , set suc = 1. For j ∈ {1, . . . , λ},
if Mj =MS , set guessj = 1. The outcome of the game is
(
suc, {guessj′ , detectj′}j′∈{1,...,λ}
)
.
Definition 4 (Utility). The utility Uj(A1, . . . ,Aλ, U) of adversary j when the strategy profile
(A1, . . . ,Aλ) and utility function U are employed is the expected value E[U(j, out)], where U is
a function that maps index j and the outcome out =
(
suc, {guessj′ , detectj′}j′∈{1,...,λ}
)
of the game
Gamemult(Π,A1, . . . ,Aλ) to real values and the probability is taken over the randomness of the game.
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We define the security of SMT protocols against multiple adversaries. For strategies B1, . . . ,Bλ,
and Aj, we denote by (Aj,B−j) the strategy profile (B1, . . . ,Bj−1,Aj,Bj+1, . . . ,Bλ).
Definition 5 (PSMT against Multiple Rational Adversaries). An SMT protocol Π is perfectly
secure against rational (t1, . . . , tλ)-adversaries with utility function U if there are tj-adversary Bj
for j ∈ {1, . . . , λ} such that
1. Perfect security: Π is (0, 0)-SMT against (B1, . . . ,Bλ), and
2. Nash equilibrium: Uj(Aj ,B−j, U) ≤ Uj(Bj ,B−j, U) for any tj-adversary Aj for every j ∈
{1, . . . , λ}.
As in the analysis of protocols against a single adversary, we will consider a random guessing
strategy profile (B1, . . . ,Bλ) in which each Bj is a random guessing adversary. For such a strategy
profile, the perfect security immediately follows if the protocol satisfies the correctness.
Timid Adversaries
For the case of multiple adversaries, we define timid adversaries who prefer other adversaries’
tampering to be detected. This property makes rational adversaries avoid cooperating with each
other. Let Umulttimid be the set of utility functions that satisfy the following three conditions:
1. U(j, out) > U(j, out′) if suc < suc′, guessj = guess
′
j , and detectj = detect
′
j ;
2. U(j, out) > U(j, out′) if suc = suc′, guessj = guess
′
j, detectj < detect
′
j, and detectk = detect
′
k
for every k ∈ {1, . . . , λ} \ {j}; and
3. U(j, out) > U(j, out′) if suc = suc′, guessj = guess
′
j, detectk > detect
′
k for some k 6= j, and
detectj′ = detect
′
j′ for every j
′ ∈ {1, . . . , λ} \ {k},
where out =
(
suc, {guessj , detectj}j∈{1,...,λ}
)
and out′ =
(
suc′, {guess′j, detect
′
j}j∈{1,...,λ}
)
are the
outcomes of the SMT game.
Let Umultst-timid be the set of utility functions satisfying the following condition in addition to the
above three:
4. U(j, out) > U(j, out′) if suc > suc′, guessj = guess
′
j, detectj < detect
′
j, and detectk = detect
′
k
for every k ∈ {1, . . . , λ} \ {j}.
An adversary is said to be timid if his utility function is in Umulttimid, and strictly timid if the utility
function is in Umultst-timid. For j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and b ∈ {0, 1}, we write detect−j = b if detectj′ = b for
every j′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{j}. In the analysis of our protocols, we use the following values of the utility
of adversary j ∈ {1, . . . , λ}.
• u′1 is the utility when Pr[guessj = 1] =
1
|M| , suc = 0, detectj = 0, detect−j = 0;
• u′2 is the utility when Pr[guessj = 1] =
1
|M| , suc = 1, detectj = 0, detect−j = 0;
• u′′3 is the utility when Pr[guessj = 1] =
1
|M| , suc = 0, detectj = 1, detect−j = 1;
• u′3 is the utility when Pr[guessj = 1] =
1
|M| , suc = 0, detectj = 1, detect−j = 0;
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• u′4 is the utility when Pr[guessj = 1] =
1
|M| , suc = 1, detectj = 1, detect−j = 0.
For any utility function in Umulttimid, it holds that u
′
1 > max{u
′
2, u
′′
3}, min{u
′
2, u
′
3} > u
′
4, and u
′′
3 > u
′
3.
If the utility is in Umultst-timid, it holds that u
′
1 > u
′
2 > u
′′
3 > u
′
3 > u
′
4.
7 Protocols against Multiple Adversaries
7.1 Protocol by Public Discussion
We show that the SJST protocol of [36] gives a perfect SMT-PD protocol against multiple adver-
saries. As in Section 4.1, we modify the SJST protocol such that in the second and the third rounds,
if bi = 1 in B or vi = 1 in V for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the special message “DETECT at i” is also
sent together.
Theorem 6. For any λ ≥ 2, let t1, . . . , tλ be integers satisfying t1+ · · ·+ tλ ≤ n and 1 ≤ ti ≤ n− 1
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}. If the parameter ℓ in the SJST protocol satisfies
ℓ ≥ max
t∈{t1,...,tλ}
{
1 + log2 t+ log2
u′3 − u
′
4
u′2 − u
′
4 − α
, 1 +
1
t
log2
u′1 − u
′
3
α
}
for some α ∈ (0, u′2−u
′
4), then the protocol is perfectly secure against rational (t1, . . . , tλ)-adversaries
with utility function U ∈ Umulttimid.
Proof. We note that the same argument as the proof of Theorem 3 can apply to the case of multiple
adversaries. This is because even in the presence of multiple adversaries, as long as we consider
a Nash equilibrium, each adversary j tries to maximize the utility by choosing a strategy Aj by
assuming that all the other adversaries follow the random guessing strategy profile B−j. It is exactly
the case analyzed in the proof of Theorem 3. Since the utility values u′1, u
′
2, u
′
3, u
′
4 corresponds to
those of u1, u2, u3, u4, respectively, in Theorem 3, the statement follows.
7.2 Protocol for Minority Corruptions
We provide a non-interactive SMT protocol based on secret-sharing and pairwise independent hash
functions. See Appendices A.2 and A.3 for the definitions. The protocol is secure against multiple
adversaries who only corrupt minorities of the channels. Namely, we assume that each adversary
corrupts at most ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ channels. Note that the protocol does not use the public channel as
in the protocol in Section 7.1.
We describe the construction of our protocol. The protocol can employ any secret-sharing
scheme of threshold ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋, which may be Shamir’s scheme. Let (s1, . . . , sn) be the shares
generated by the scheme from the message to be sent. Then, pairwise independent hash functions
hi are chosen for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For any j 6= i, hi(sj) is computed as an authentication tag for
sj. Then, (si, hi, {hi(sj)}j 6=i) will be sent through the i-th channel. When si is modified to s
′
i 6= si
by some adversary, the modification can be detected by the property of pairwise independent hash
functions because the adversary cannot modify all tags hj(si) for j 6= i. Also, a random mask ri,j
is applied to hi(sj) to conceal the information of sj in hi(sj). The masks {rj,i}j 6=i for si will be
sent through the i-th channel so that only the i-th channel reveals the information of si. Hence,
the message sent through the i-th channel is (si, hi, {hi(sj) ⊕ ri,j}j 6=i, {rj,i}j 6=i). As long as each
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adversary corrupts minorities of the channels, a single adversary cannot cause erroneous detection
of silent adversaries.
We give a formal description.
Protocol 1. Let (Share,Reconst) be a secret-sharing scheme of threshold ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋, where a
secret is chosen from M, and the shares are defined over V. Let m ∈ M be the message to be sent
by the sender, and H = {h : V → {0, 1}ℓ} a class of pairwise independent hash functions.
1. The sender does the following: Generate the shares (s1, . . . , sn) by Share(m), and randomly
choose hi ∈ H for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Also, for every distinct i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, choose
ri,j ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ uniformly at random, and then compute Ti,j = hi(sj) ⊕ ri,j. Then, for each i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, send mi =
(
si, hi, {Ti,j}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}, {rj,i}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}
)
through the i-th channel.
2. After receiving m˜i =
(
s˜i, h˜i, {T˜i,j}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}, {r˜j,i}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}
)
on each channel i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, the receiver does the following: For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, compute the list
Li =
{
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : h˜i(s˜j)⊕ r˜i,j 6= T˜i,j
}
. If a majority of the lists coincide with a list L,
reconstruct the message m˜ by Reconst({i, s˜i}i∈{1,...,n}\L), send messages “DETECT at i” for
every i ∈ L, and output m˜. Otherwise, output ⊥.
Theorem 7. For any λ ≥ 2, let t1, . . . , tλ be integers satisfying t1 + · · · + tλ ≤ n and 1 ≤ ti ≤
⌊(n− 1)/2⌋ for every i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}. If the parameter ℓ in Protocol 1 satisfies
ℓ ≥ log2
u′1 − u
′
4
u′2 − u
′
4
+ 2 log2(n+ 1)− 1,
then the protocol is perfectly secure against rational (t1, . . . , tλ)-adversaries with utility function
U ∈ Umulttimid.
Proof. For k ∈ {1, . . . , λ}, let Bk be a random guessing tk-adversary. First, note that, for any
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the information of si can be obtained only by mi, the message sent over the i-th
channel. This is because for any j 6= i, hj(si) is masked as hj(si) ⊕ ri,j, and the random mask ri,j
is included only in mi. Also, each si is a share of the secret sharing of threshold ⌊(n− 1)/2⌋. Since
Bk can obtain at most ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ shares, Bk can learn nothing about the message sent from the
sender. Thus, the perfect security is achieved for (B1, . . . ,Bλ).
Next, we show that (B1, . . . ,Bλ) is a Nash equilibrium. For k ∈ {1, . . . , λ}, let Ak be any tk-
adversary. Since Uk(B1, . . . ,Bλ) = u
′
2, to increase the utility, Ak needs to get either (a) suc = 0, or
(b) detectk = 0 and detectk′ = 1 for some k
′ 6= k.
For the case of (a), Ak tries to change si into s˜i 6= si for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since Ak does
not corrupt some i′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the index i corrupted by Ak will be included in the list Li′ unless
hi′(s˜i)⊕ r˜i′,i = Ti′,i. Note that s˜i and r˜i′,i are included in m˜i, and thus can be changed, but hi′ and
Ti′,i are in m˜i′ , and thus have been unchanged. It follows from the property of pairwise independent
hash functions that this can happen with probability 21−ℓ assuming s˜i 6= si. Thus, i will be included
in Li′ with probability at least 1− 2
1−ℓ. Since there are at least n−⌊(n− 1)/2⌋ = ⌈(n+1)/2⌉ such
indices i′, the probability that a majority of the lists contains i is at least 1−⌈(n+1)/2⌉·21−ℓ . Note
that Ak may corrupt ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ channels in total. The probability that all the corrupted indices
coincide with a majority of the list is at least 1−⌊(n−1)/2⌋·⌈(n+1)/2⌉·21−ℓ ≥ 1−(n+1)2 ·2−(ℓ+1). In
that case, the message can be reconstructed by other shares, and thus we have suc = 1, detectk = 1,
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and detectk′ = 0 for k
′ 6= k, resulting in the utility of u′4. Since Ak only corrupts a minority of the
channels, it cannot cause detectk′ = 1 for k
′ 6= k. Thus, the maximum utility of Ak is u
′
1. Thus, the
utility of adversary k when tampering as s˜i 6= si is at most
Uk(Ak,B−k) ≤ (n+ 1)
2 · 2−(ℓ+1) · u′1 +
(
1− (n+ 1)2 · 2−(ℓ+1)
)
· u′4,
which is at most u′2 by the assumption on ℓ.
For the case of (b), Ak needs to generate the corrupted message m˜i for the i-th channel so that
for a majority of indices j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, h˜i(sj) ⊕ ri,j 6= T˜i,j , where each j is corrupted by Bk′ with
k′ 6= k, and thus ri,j and sj are not tampered with. Since Ak only corrupts a minority of the
channels, this cannot happen.
Therefore, (B1, . . . ,Bλ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Note that the single-adversary setting of Section 3 can be seen as a special case of the multiple-
adversary setting. Namely, it is equivalent to the setting in which there are two adversaries, A1
and A2, such that A1 tries to violate the security requirements of SMT by corrupting at most
t ≤ n − 1 channels, whereas A2, who corrupt n − t ≥ 1 channels, does nothing for the protocol.
Since Protocol 1 does not rely on the additional utility of u′′3 in the security analysis, it also gives
an SMT protocol in the single-adversary setting.
Corollary 3. If the parameter ℓ in Protocol 1 satisfies
ℓ ≥ log2
u1 − u4
u2 − u4
+ 2 log2(n+ 1)− 1,
then the protocol is perfectly secure against rational t-adversary with utility function U ∈ Utimid for
any t < n/2.
7.3 Protocol for Majority Corruptions
We present a protocol against adversaries who may corrupt a majority of the channels. We assume
that adversaries are strictly timid in this setting. The protocol is a minor modification of the protocol
for minority corruption. In Protocol 1, the lists Li’s of the corrupted channels are generated for each
channel, and the final list L is determined by the majority voting. Thus, if an adversary corrupts
a majority of the channels, the result of the majority voting can be easily forged, and hence the
protocol does not work for majority corruption.
To cope with majority corruptions, we modify the protocol such that (1) the threshold of the
secret sharing is changed from ⌊(n−1)/2⌋ to n−1, (2) the list Li contains both i and j if the masked
tag hj(si)⊕ ri,j does not match Ti,j, and (3) the final list L of the corrupted channels is composed
of the union of all the set Li, namely, L = L1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ln. The threshold of n − 1 can be achieved
by Shamir’s scheme. Intuitively, this protocol works for strictly timid adversaries because if some
adversary tampers with messages over the i-th channel, the tampering will be detected with high
probability, and in that case, i must be included in the final list L. Since strictly timid adversaries
try tampering on his channels not to be detected, they will keep silent.
We give a formal description of the protocol.
Protocol 2. Let (Share,Reconst) be a secret-sharing scheme of threshold n − 1, where a secret is
chosen from M, and the shares are defined over V. Let m ∈ M be the message to be sent by the
sender, and H = {h : V → {0, 1}ℓ} a class of pairwise independent hash functions.
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1. The sender does the following: Generate the shares (s1, . . . , sn) by Share(m), and randomly
choose hi ∈ H for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Also, for every distinct i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, choose
ri,j ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ uniformly at random, and then compute Ti,j = hi(sj) ⊕ ri,j. Then, for each i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, send mi =
(
si, hi, {Ti,j}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}, {rj,i}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}
)
through the i-th channel.
2. After receiving m˜i =
(
s˜i, h˜i, {T˜i,j}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}, {r˜j,i}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}
)
on each channel i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, the receiver does the following: For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, compute the list
Li =
{
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : h˜i(s˜j)⊕ r˜i,j 6= T˜i,j
}
. Then, set L = L1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ln. If L = ∅, recon-
struct the message m˜ by Reconst({i, s˜i}i∈{1,...,n}), and output m˜. Otherwise, send messages
“DETECT at i” for every i ∈ L, and output ⊥ as the failure symbol.
Theorem 8. For any λ ≥ 2, let t1, . . . , tλ be integers satisfying t1+ · · ·+ tλ ≤ n and 1 ≤ ti ≤ n− 1
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}. If the parameter ℓ in Protocol 2 satisfies
ℓ ≥ log2
u′1 − u
′′
3
u′2 − u
′′
3
− 1,
then the protocol is perfectly secure against rational (t1, . . . , tλ)-adversaries with utility function
U ∈ Umultst-timid.
Proof. For k ∈ {1, . . . , λ}, let Bk be a random guessing tk-adversary. By the same reason as in the
proof of Theorem 7, the protocol is perfectly secure against (B1, . . . ,Bλ).
Next, we show that (B1, . . . ,Bλ) is a Nash equilibrium. Let Ak be any tk-adversary for k ∈
{1, . . . , λ}. As in the proof of Theorem 7, Ak needs to yield either (a) suc = 0, or (b) detectk = 0
and detectk′ = 1 for some k
′ 6= k. For the case of (a), Ak needs to corrupt the i-th channel so
that s˜i 6= si. There is at least one index i
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n} that is not corrupted by Ak. Thus, by
the property of pairwise independent hash functions, the index i is included in the list Li′ with
probability at least 1 − 21−ℓ, in which case the utility of Ak is at most u
′′
3. Hence, the expected
utility is at most
Uk(Ak,B−k) ≤ 2
−(ℓ+1) · u′1 +
(
1− 2−(ℓ+1)
)
· u′′3,
which is at most u′2 by assumption. For the case of (b), if some index i is in the final list L by the
tampering by Ak, then some channel i
′ 6= i corrupted by Ak is also included in L. Thus, (b) cannot
happen. Therefore, (B1, . . . ,Bλ) is a Nash equilibrium.
8 SMT against Malicious and Rational Adversaries
In the previous sections, we have discussed SMT against rational adversaries. We have assumed
that all the adversaries behave rationally. The assumption may be strong in the sense that all
of them can be characterized by the utility function we defined. In this section, we discuss more
realistic situations in which some adversary may not behave rationally, but maliciously.
8.1 Security Model
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are λ ≥ 2 adversaries, and adversaries 1, . . . , λ− 1
are rational, and adversary λ behaves maliciously. We use the same definitions of the SMT
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game and the utility function in Section 6. We define robust security against rational adver-
saries. A similar definition appeared in the context of rational secret sharing [1]. For strate-
gies B1, . . . ,Bλ−1,Aλ,Aj for j ∈ {1, . . . , λ − 1}, we denote by (Aj,B−j ,Aλ) the strategy profile
(B1, . . . ,Bj−1,Aj ,Bj+1, . . . ,Bλ−1,Aλ).
Definition 6 (Robust PSMT against Rational Adversaries). An SMT protocol Π is t∗-robust
perfectly secure against rational (t1, . . . , tλ−1)-adversaries with utility function U if there are tj-
adversary Bj for j ∈ {1, . . . , λ − 1} such that for any tj-adversary Aj for j ∈ {1, . . . , λ − 1} and
t∗-adversary Aλ,
1. Perfect security: Π is (0, 0)-SMT against (B1, . . . ,Bλ−1,Aλ), and
2. Robust Nash equilibrium: Uj(Aj,B−j ,Aλ, U) ≤ Uj(Bj,B−j ,Aλ, U) for every j ∈ {1, . . . , λ−1}
in the SMT game.
Compared to Definition 5, robust PSMT requires that the perfect security is achieved even
in the presence of a malicious adversary Aλ, and a strategy profile (B1, . . . ,Bλ−1,Aλ) is a Nash
equilibrium for adversary j ∈ {1, . . . , λ− 1}.
8.2 Protocol against Malicious and Rational Adversaries
We show that a robust PSMT protocol can be constructed based on the protocol for minority
corruption in Section 7.2. For t∗-robust against (t1, . . . , tλ−1)-adversaries, we assume that t
∗ ≤
⌊(n − 1)/3⌋ and 1 ≤ tj ≤ min{⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ − t
∗, (n − 1)/3⌋} for each j ∈ {1, . . . , λ − 1}. Our
non-interactive protocol is obtained simply by modifying the threshold of the secret sharing in
Protocol 1 from ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ to ⌊(n − 1)/3⌋. This protocol works because when only a malicious
adversary corrupts at most ⌊(n− 1)/3⌋ channels, the transmission failure does not occur due to the
error-correction property of the secret sharing. Thus, perfect security is achieved in the presence of
a malicious adversary. Even if some rational adversary deviates from the protocol together with a
malicious adversary, they can affect at most tj + t
∗ ≤ ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ votes, and thus any tampering
will be identified with high probability by the majority voting.
The formal description is given below.
Protocol 3. Let (Share,Reconst) be a secret-sharing scheme of threshold ⌊(n − 1)/3⌋, where a
secret is chosen from M, the shares are defined over V, and the secret can be reconstructed as long
as ⌊(n − 1)/3⌋ out of n shares are tampered. Let m ∈ M be the message to be sent by the sender,
and H = {h : V → {0, 1}ℓ} a class of pairwise independent hash functions.
1. The sender does the following: Generate the shares (s1, . . . , sn) by Share(m), and randomly
choose hi ∈ H for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For every distinct i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, choose ri,j ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ
uniformly at random, and then compute Ti,j = hi(sj) ⊕ ri,j . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, send
mi =
(
si, hi, {Ti,j}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}, {rj,i}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}
)
through the i-th channel.
2. After receiving m˜i =
(
s˜i, h˜i, {T˜i,j}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}, {r˜j,i}j∈{1,...,n}\{i}
)
on each channel i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, the receiver does the following: For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, compute the list
Li =
{
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : h˜i(s˜j)⊕ r˜i,j 6= T˜i,j
}
. If a majority of the list coincide with a list L,
reconstruct the message m˜ by Reconst({i, s˜i}i∈{1,...,n}), send message “DETECT at i” for ev-
ery i ∈ L, and output m˜. Otherwise, output ⊥.
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For the security analysis, we define the values of utility of adversary j ∈ {1, . . . , λ−1} such that
• u′′1 is the utility in the same case as u
′
1 except that detectλ = 1,
• u′′2 is the utility in the same case as u
′
2 except that detectλ = 1, and
• u′′4 is the utility in the same case as u
′
4 except that detectλ = 1.
The values u′1, u
′
2, u
′
4 are defined as the case that detectj′ = 0 for every j
′ ∈ {1, . . . , λ} \ {j}. In
the above, the values u′′1 , u
′′
2, u
′′
4 are defined as detectj′ = 0 for every j
′ ∈ {1, . . . , λ − 1} \ {j} and
detectλ = 1.
Theorem 9. For any λ ≥ 2, let t1, . . . , tλ−1, t
∗ be integers satisfying t1 + · · · + tλ−1 + t
∗ ≤ n,
0 ≤ t∗ ≤ ⌊(n − 1)/3⌋, and 1 ≤ ti ≤ min{⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ − t
∗, ⌊(n − 1)/3⌋} for every i ∈ {1, . . . , λ− 1}.
If the parameter ℓ in Protocol 3 satisfies
ℓ ≥ max
(u∗
1
,u∗
2
,u∗
4
)∈{(u′
1
,u′
2
,u′
4
),(u′′
1
,u′′
2
,u′′
4
)}
{
log2
u∗1 − u
∗
4
u∗2 − u
∗
4
+ 2 log2(n+ 1)− 1
}
,
then the protocol is t∗-robust perfectly secure against rational (t1, . . . , tλ−1)-adversaries with utility
function U ∈ Umulttimid.
Proof. For k ∈ {1, . . . , λ− 1}, let Bk be a random guessing adversary. Let Aλ be any t
∗-adversary.
Note that the information of si can be obtained only by seeing mi since each hj(si) is masked
by rj,i, which is included only in mi. Since each si is a share of the secret sharing of threshold
⌊(n− 1)/3⌋, each adversary Bk and Aλ can learn nothing about the original message. Although at
most t∗ messages may be corrupted by Aλ, it follows from the property of the underlying secret
sharing that the message can be correctly recovered in the presence of t∗ ≤ ⌊(n− 1)/3⌋ corruptions
out of n shares. Thus, the protocol is perfectly secure against (B1, . . . ,Bλ−1,Aλ).
Next, we show that (B1, . . . ,Bλ−1,Aλ) is a Nash equilibrium for any Aλ. When the strategy
profile (B1, . . . ,Bλ−1,Aλ) is employed, we have suc = 1. Hence, to increase the utility of adversary
k, Ak needs to get either (a) suc = 0, or (b) detectk = 0, and detectk′ = 1 for some k
′ 6= k.
For the case of (a), Ak tries to change si into s˜i 6= si for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. When playing with
(Ak,B−k,Aλ), the number of corrupted channels is at most tk + t
∗ ≤ ⌊(n− 1)/2⌋. Hence, there are
a majority of indices i′ that is not corrupted by Ak or Aλ, and for each i
′, the tampering on the
i-th channel will be detected; namely, the list Li′ will include i with high probability. By the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 7, any tampering of s˜i 6= si by Ak and Aλ is detected with
probability at least 1− (n+ 1)2 · 2−(ℓ+1). Thus, we have that
Uk(Ak,B−k,Aλ) ≤ (n + 1)
2 · 2−(ℓ+1) · u∗1 +
(
1− (n+ 1)2 · 2−(ℓ+1)
)
· u∗4 ≤ u
∗
2,
where (u∗1, u
∗
2, u
∗
4) is either (u
′
1, u
′
2, u
′
4) or (u
′′
1 , u
′′
2 , u
′′
4). The last inequality follows from the assump-
tion.
For the case of (b), Ak needs the result that j ∈ Li for a majority of the list Li’s, where the
j-th channel is corrupted by adversary k′. However, since Ak and Aλ can corrupt a minority of the
channels, this event cannot happen.
Thus, we have shown that (B1, . . . ,Bλ−1) is a robust Nash equilibrium.
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9 Conclusions
We have introduced game-theoretic security models in SMT. We have constructed perfect SMT
protocols against rational timid adversaries. Several protocols could circumvent the known im-
possibility results in the traditional cryptographic model. We have also constructed perfect SMT
protocols when multiple rational adversaries corrupt all the channels. The results have revealed
that we may not need to guarantee that one resource/channel is not corrupted by adversaries if
they may not cooperate. A feature of our model is that the best strategy for adversaries is to
behave harmlessly. Namely, adversaries rationally decide to do nothing for the protocols. Although
this conclusion seems to be similar to the honest-but-curious adversary model, the difference is
significant between the situations in which adversaries can potentially attack actively or not.
A direction for future work is to apply our game-theoretic models to other primitives and
protocols. The model of timid adversaries might be useful for constructing more efficient and
resilient protocols. It can be used to avoid the impossibility results in the traditional setting. Since
rational adversaries in our models do not attack actively, it seems to be easier to construct protocols
by composition. Another direction is further to study the mixed model of malicious and rational
adversaries. Since real-life situations may fall into this setting, it is beneficial to construct more
efficient protocols than in the usual cryptographic setting.
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A Building Blocks
A.1 The SJST protocol
We describe an almost-reliable SMT-PD protocol proposed by Shi, Jiang, Safavi-Naini, and
Tuhin [36]. We refer it as the SJST protocol.
The protocol is based on the simple protocol for “static” adversaries in which the sender sends
a random key Ri over the i-th channel for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and the encrypted message c =
m⊕R1⊕ · · · ⊕Rn over the public channel. Suppose that the adversary sees the messages sent over
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the corrupted channels, but does not change them. Since the adversary cannot see at least one key
Rj when corrupting less than n channels, the mask R1⊕· · ·⊕Rn for the encryption looks random for
the adversary. Thus, the message m can be securely encrypted and reliably sent through the public
channel. To cope with “active” adversaries, who may change messages sent over the corrupted
channels, the SJST protocol employs a mechanism for detecting the adversary’s tampering by using
hash functions. Specifically, the pairwise independent hash functions (see Appendix A.2) satisfy
the following property: when a pair of keys (ri, Ri) is changed to (r
′
i, R
′
i) 6= (ri, Ri), the hash value
for (ri, Ri) is different from that for (r
′
i, R
′
i) with high probability if the hash function is chosen
randomly after the tampering occurred. In the SJST protocol, the sender sends a pair of keys
(ri, Ri) over the i-th channel. Then, the receiver chooses n pairwise independent hash functions
hi’s, and sends them over the public channel. By comparing hash values for (ri, Ri)’s sent by the
sender with those for (r′i, R
′
i)’s received by the receiver, they can identify the channels for which
messages, i.e., keys, were tampered with. By ignoring keys sent over such channels, the sender can
correctly encrypt a message m with untampered keys and send the encryption reliably over the
public channel.
We describe the SJST protocol below, which is a three-round protocol, and achieves the relia-
bility with δ = (n− 1) · 21−ℓ, where ℓ is the length of hash values.
Protocol 4 (The SJST protocol [36]). Let n be the number of channels, m ∈ M the message to
be sent by the sender S, and H = {h : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ℓ} a class of pairwise independent hash
functions.
1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, S chooses ri ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ and Ri ∈ {0, 1}
k uniformly at random, and
sends the pair (ri, Ri) over the i-th channel.
2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, R receives (r′i, R
′
i) through the i-th channel, and then chooses hi ← H
uniformly at random. If |r′i| 6= ℓ or |R
′
i| 6= k, set bi = 1, and otherwise, set bi = 0. Then,
set T ′i = r
′
i ⊕ hi(R
′
i), and Hi = (hi, T
′
i ) if bi = 0, and Hi = ⊥ otherwise. Finally, R sends
(B,H1, . . . ,Hn) over the public channel, where B = (b1, . . . , bn).
3. S receives (B,H1, . . . ,Hn) through the public channel. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with bi = 0, S
computes Ti = ri ⊕ hi(Ri), and sets vi = 0 if Ti = T
′
i , and vi = 1 otherwise. Then, S sends
(V, c) over the public channel, where V = (v1, . . . , vn), and c = m⊕ (
⊕
vi=0
Ri).
4. On receiving (V, c), R recovers m = c⊕ (
⊕
vi=0
Ri).
Theorem 10 ([36]). The SJST protocol is (0, (n−1) ·21−ℓ)-SMT against t-adversary for any t < n.
We can find a complete proof of the above theorem in [36]. For self-containment, we give a brief
sketch of the proof.
• Privacy : The adversary can get c = m ⊕ (
⊕
vi=0
Ri) through the public channel. Since m
is masked by uniformly random Ri’s, the adversary has to corrupt all the i-th channels with
vi = 0 to recover m. However, since any t-adversary can corrupt at most t (< n) channels,
the adversary can cause vi = 1 for at most n−1 i’s. Hence, there is at least one i with vi = 0,
for which the adversary cannot obtain Ri. Thus, the protocol satisfies the perfect privacy.
• Reliability : Since the protocol uses the public channel at the second and the third rounds,
the adversary can tamper with channels only at the first round. Suppose that the adversary
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tampers with (ri, Ri). If Ri 6= R
′
i and Ti = T
′
i , then R would recover a wrong message, but
the tampering is not detected. It follows from the property of pairwise independent hash
functions described in Appendix A.2 that the probability that the above event happens is at
most (n− 1)21−ℓ. Thus, the protocol achieves the reliability with δ = (n− 1) · 21−ℓ.
A.2 Pairwise Independent Hash Functions
Wegman and Carter [38] introduced the notion of pairwise independent (or strongly universal) hash
functions and gave its construction. As in the SJST protocol described above, our protocols employ
pairwise independent hash functions.
Definition 7. Suppose that a class of hash functions H = {h : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}ℓ}, where m ≥ ℓ,
satisfies the following: for any distinct x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}
m and y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ,
Pr
h∈H
[h(x1) = y1 ∧ h(x2) = y2] ≤ γ.
Then H is called γ-pairwise independent. In the above, the randomness comes from the uniform
choice of h over H.
Here we mention a useful property of almost pairwise independent hash function, which guar-
antees the security of some SMT protocols.
Lemma 1 ([36]). Let H = {h : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}ℓ} be a γ-almost pairwise independent hash function
family. Then for any (x1, c1) 6= (x2, c2) ∈ {0, 1}
m × {0, 1}ℓ, we have
Pr
h∈H
[c1 ⊕ h(x1) = c2 ⊕ h(x2)] ≤ 2
ℓγ.
In [38], Wegman and Carter constructed a family of 21−2ℓ-almost pairwise independent hash
functions. In particular, their hash function family Hwc = {h : {0, 1}
m → {0, 1}ℓ} satisfies that
Pr
h∈Hwc
[h(x1) = y1 ∧ h(x2) = y2] = 2
1−2ℓ
for any distinct x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}
m and for any y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ and also
Pr
h∈Hwc
[c1 ⊕ h(x1) = c2 ⊕ h(x2)] = 2
1−ℓ (6)
for any distinct pairs (x1, c1) 6= (x2, c2) ∈ {0, 1}
m × {0, 1}ℓ.
A.3 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing, introduced by Shamir [35] and Blackley [6], enables us to distribute the secret
information securely. Let s ∈ F be a secret from some finite field F. A (threshold) secret-sharing
scheme provides a way for distributing s into n shares s1, . . . , sn such that, for some parameter
t > 0, (1) any t shares give no information about s, and (2) any t+ 1 shares uniquely determine s.
Definition 8. Let t, n be positive integers with t < n. A (t, n)-secret sharing scheme with range G
consists of two algorithms (Share,Reconst) satisfying the following conditions:
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• Correctness: For any s ∈ G and I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |I| > t,
Pr [(s˜, J)← Reconst ({i, si}i∈I) ∧ s˜ = s] = 1,
where (s1, . . . , sn)← Share(s), and
• Perfect Privacy: For any s, s′ ∈ G and I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |I| ≤ t,
∆
(
{si}i∈I , {s
′
i}i∈I
)
= 0,
where (s1, . . . , sn)← Share(s) and (s
′
1, . . . , s
′
n)← Share(s
′).
Shamir [35] gave a (t, n)-secret sharing scheme based on polynomial evaluations for any t < n.
Let F be a finite field of size at least n. Then, for a given secret s ∈ F, the sharing algorithm chooses
random elements r1, . . . , rt ∈ F, and constructs a polynomial f(x) = s + r1x + r2x
2 + · · · + rtx
t
of degree t over F. Then, for a fixed set of n distinct elements {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ F, the i-th share is
f(ai) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Given {i, f(ai)}i∈I for |I| > t, the reconstruction algorithm recovers the
polynomial f by polynomial interpolation, and outputs f(0) = s as a recovered secret.
McEliece and Sarwate [34] observed that Shamir’s scheme is closely related to Reed-Solomon
codes, and thus the shares can be efficiently recovered even if some of them have been tampered
with. We use the fact that even if at most ⌊(n − 1)/3⌋ out of the n shares are tampered with,
the original secret can be correctly recovered by decoding algorithms of Reed-Solomon codes. This
property is called robustness. Although the robustness is a desirable property, it is known that
robust secret sharing is impossible when t/2 shares are tampered with [29].
In this work, we need a weaker notion of robustness in which any tampering actions should be
detected with high probability. Such robust secret sharing was studied by Cramer et al. [9]. They
introduced the notion of algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes, and presented a simple way
for constructing robust secret sharing from linear secret sharing and AMD codes. More precisely,
the robustness required for our protocol is slightly different from one defined in [9]2.
Definition 9. Let t, n be positive integers with t < n. A (t, n, δ)-robust secret sharing scheme with
range G consists of two algorithms (Share,Reconst) satisfying the following conditions:
• Correctness: For any s ∈ G and I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |I| > t,
Pr [Reconst ({i, si}i∈I) = s] = 1,
where (s1, . . . , sn)← Share(s).
• Perfect Privacy: For any s, s′ ∈ G and I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |I| ≤ t,
∆
(
{si}i∈I , {s
′
i}i∈I
)
= 0,
where (s1, . . . , sn)← Share(s) and (s
′
1, . . . , s
′
n)← Share(s
′).
2The robustness in [9] requires that the output of the reconstruction algorithm should be either the original message
or the failure symbol with high probability. Namely, it is allowed to recover the original message even if some shares
are tampered with. In Definition 9, we require that if some shares are tampered with, the output of the reconstruction
algorithm should be the failure symbol.
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• Robustness: For any s ∈ G and I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |I| ≤ t and adversary A, if s˜i 6= si for
some i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Pr
[
Reconst
(
{i, s˜i}i∈{1,...,n}
)
6= ⊥
]
≤ δ,
where
s˜i =
{
A(i, s, {si}i∈I) if i ∈ I
si if i /∈ I
and (s1, . . . , sn)← Share(s).
We can see that the construction of [9] satisfies the above definition. Specifically, we have the
following theorem, which will be used in our protocol against strictly timid adversaries in Section 4.2.
See Appendix B for the proof.
Theorem 11. Let F be a finite field of size q and characteristic p, and d an integer such that d+2
is not divisible by p. For any positive integers t and n satisfying t < n ≤ qd, there is an explicit
and efficient scheme of (t, n, (d+ 1)/q)-robust secret sharing with range Fd, where each share is an
element of Fd+2.
B Proof of Theorem 11
To prove the theorem, we define the notion of algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes in
which the security requirement is slightly different from that in [9] for our purpose.
Definition 10. An (M,N, δ)-algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code is a probabilistic func-
tion E : S → G, where S is a set of size M and G is an additive group of order N , together with a
decoding function D : G → S ∪ {⊥} such that
• Correctness: For any s ∈ S, Pr[D(E(s)) = s] = 1.
• Security: For any s ∈ S and ∆ ∈ G \ {0}, Pr[D(E(s) + ∆) 6= ⊥] ≤ δ.
An AMD code is called systematic if S is a group, and the encoding is of the form
E : S → S × G1 × G2, s 7→ (s, x, f(x, s))
for some function f and random x ∈ G1. The decoding function D of a systematic AMD code is
given by D(s′, x′, f ′) = s′ if f ′ = f(x′, s′), and ⊥ otherwise.
Note that, for a systematic AMD code, the correctness immediately follows from the definition
of the decoding function. The security requirement can be stated such that for any s ∈ S and
(∆s,∆x,∆f ) ∈ S × G1 × G2 \ {(0, 0, 0)}, Prx[f(s+∆s, x+∆x) = f(s, x) + ∆f ] ≤ δ.
We show that a systematic AMD code given in [9] satisfies the above definition.
Proposition 1. Let F be a finite field of size q and characteristic p, and d any integer such that
d+2 is not divisible by p. Define the encoding function E : Fd → Fd×F×F by E(s) = (s, x, f(x, s))
where
f(x, s) = xd+2 +
d∑
i=1
six
i
and s = (s1, . . . , sd). Then, the construction is a systematic (q
d, qd+2, (d + 1)/q)-AMD code.
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Proof. We show that for any s ∈ Fd and (∆s,∆x,∆f ) ∈ F
d×F×F\{(0d, 0, 0)}, Pr[f(s+∆s, x+∆x) =
f(s, x) + ∆f ] ≤ δ. The event in the probability is that
(x+∆x)
d+2 +
d∑
i=1
s′i(x+∆x)
i = xd+2 +
d∑
i=1
six
i +∆f , (7)
where s′i is the i-th element of s+∆s. The left-hand side of (7) can be represented by
xd+2 + (d+ 2)∆xx
d+1 +
d∑
i=1
s′ix
i +∆xp(x)
for some polynomial p(x) of degree at most d. Thus, (7) can be rewritten as
(d+ 2)∆xx
d+1 +
d∑
i=1
(s′i − si)x
i +∆xp(x)−∆f = 0. (8)
We discuss the probability that (8) happens when x is chosen uniformly at random. We consider
the following cases:
1. When ∆x 6= 0, the coefficient of x
d+1 is (d+ 2)∆x, which is not zero by the assumption that
d+ 2 is not divisible by p. Then, (8) has at most d+ 1 solutions x. Hence the event happens
with probability at most (d+ 1)/q.
2. When ∆x = 0, we consider two subcases:
(a) If ∆s 6= 0, then s
′
i − si 6= 0 for some i. Hence (8) has at most d solutions x. Thus the
event happens with probability at most d/p.
(b) If ∆s = 0, (8) is equivalent to ∆f = 0. Since ∆f 6= 0 for this case, the event cannot
happen.
In every case, the event happens with probability at most (d+ 1)/q. Thus the statement follows.
As discussed in [9], a robust secret sharing scheme can be obtained by combining an AMD
code and a linear secret sharing scheme. Let (Share,Reconst) be a (t, n)-secret sharing scheme
with range G that satisfies correctness and perfect privacy of Definition 9, where we drop the
parameter δ for robustness. A linear secret sharing scheme has the property that for any s ∈
G, (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Share(s), and vector (s
′
1, . . . , s
′
n), which may contain ⊥ symbols, it holds that
Reconst({i, si + s
′
i}i∈I) = s+ Reconst({i, s
′
i}i∈I) for any I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |I| > t, where ⊥+ x =
x + ⊥ = ⊥ for all x. Examples of linear secret sharing schemes are Shamir’s scheme [35] and the
simple XOR-based (n−1, n)-scheme, in which secret s ∈ {0, 1}n is shared by (s1, . . . , sn) for random
si ∈ {0, 1}n with the restriction that s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sn = s.
We show that the same construction as in [9] works as a construction of robust secret sharing
of Definition 9.
Proposition 2. Let (Share,Reconst) be a linear (t, n)-secret sharing scheme with range G that
satisfies correctness and perfect privacy of Definition 9, and let (E,D) be an (M,N, δ)-AMD code of
Definition 10 with |G| = N . Then, the scheme (Share′,Reconst′) defined by Share′(s) = Share(E(s))
and Reconst′(S) = D(Reconst(S)) is a (t, n, δ)-robust secret sharing scheme.
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Proof. Let (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Share
′(s). Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |I| ≤ t, and (s˜1, . . . s˜n) be a sequence
of shares satisfying the requirement for input shares in robustness of Definition 9. We assume that
s˜i = si +∆
′
i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Note that ∆
′
i = 0 for every i /∈ I. Then,
Pr
[
Reconst′
(
{i, s˜i}i∈{1,...,n}
)
6= ⊥
]
= Pr
[
D
(
E(s) + Reconst({i,∆i}i∈{1,...,n})
)
6= ⊥
]
= Pr [D (E(s) + ∆) 6= ⊥] ,
where ∆ = Reconst
(
{i,∆i}i∈{1,...,n}
)
is determined by the adversary. It follows from perfect privacy
of the secret sharing scheme that ∆ is independent of E(s). Thus, if s˜i 6= si for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
the probability is at most δ by the security of the AMD code. Hence, the statement follows.
By combining Shamir’s secret sharing scheme with range Fd and the AMD code of Proposition 1,
the robust secret sharing scheme of Theorem 11 is obtained by Proposition 2.
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